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10 March 1961

Copy No. C El-9

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

TOP SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005600090001-0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 10 March 1961 25X1 DAILY BRIEF Following India's decision to commit troops to the UN Command in the Congo, Indonesia has stated that its battalion will be rotated rather than withdrawn, and Ceylon 25X1 reportedly has agreed to contribute a battalion. In Leopoldville, acting Premier Delvaux, apparently with considerable popular support but without the agreement of many of the other members of the government, is attempting to establish controls over the UN Command's operations, and UN representative Dayal expects a Congolese artillery attack on Kitona. *The US Ambassador in Leopoldville reports that feeling is running high against Dayal and that arrival of Indian troops next week might touch off violence. The Indian brigade is now scheduled to remain at least temporarily in Leopoldville.7 25X1 Backup, Page 1) 25X1 i 25X1

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	ist Peronista group shortly stage an up in three provincial been a number of o	os, with some Communist sorising, possibly similar to localities on 30 November. ther reports of plotting and sand Communists over the	upport, may the outbreaks There have arms smug-	
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		ELECTED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES		
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	Intentions Towar ing Role of PKI a	ndonesia With Special Reference of West New Guinea: Domestic and Army, the Economy, and I S. SNIE 55-61. 7 March 1961.	Politics Includ- Foreign Policy.	25X1
	Areas, 1 July - 3 Credits, and Gramaps, tables. I S10. 134 pp. 28	Bloc Economic Activities in Unit 1 December 1960: Patterns and ants, Technical Assistance, and E.I.C. Economic Intelligence B February 1961. Summary is published separate and date.	nd Prospects, ad Trade. Graphs, Report EIC-R14-] 25X1
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The situation remains "highly explosive" in the Lower

Situation in the Congo

Congo area, according to the American ambassador in Leopoldville. Officials in both the UN Command and the Leopoldville government are jittery and distrustful of each other, and individuals in both authorities are apparently acting at cross purposes. In contrast to Delvaux's actions, Foreign Minister Bomboko, in conjunction with UN Commanding General McKeown, is trying to keep the situation under control. Despite the continuing tension, Hammarskjold reportedly plans to stall on all demands being made by Delvaux pending the augmentation of

Kibwe reportedly has been Colonel Trinquier's chief supporter in the government. Although he ostensibly is the acting president in Tshombé's absence, real power reportedly is being exercised by a quadrumvirate which includes Kibwe and three Tshombé supporters—an arrangement set up by Tshombé before he left for Tananarive. The Katanga president apparently believes that Kibwe was involved in a plot to oust him with Trinquier's aid. Trinquier does not appear to have complied with the order to leave Elisabethville.

the UN force and the return of Kasavubu from Tananarive.

In a vaguely worded communique issued on 9 March, the Tananarive conference of Congolese leaders called for the creation of "new states" within the Congo, an apparent expression of recognition of existing de facto divisions. The conditions under which these new political entities are to be formed will be discussed at a future conference to be held in Elisabeth-ville. The Tananarive discussions will now take up the questions of maintenance of order in the Congo and the Congolese position regarding the UN and foreign countries.

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	Situation in Laos	25X1
25X1	small guerrilla warfare teams	25X1
	of the regular North Vietnamese Army are operating in the rugged frontier region of southern Laos where it borders Cambodia and South Vietnam. these North Vietnamese elements—possibly on the order of special forces units—were sent to the area in late December and early January to engage in sabotage and subversion and to recruit guerrillas for use in Laos and South Vietnam, where Communist paramilitary forces have been reported building up for increased terrorism this spring.	25X1
	Economic and cultural missions will be exchanged between the "government" in Xieng Khouang and both Communist China and North Vietnam, according to a 9 March announcement in Peiping. Peiping has offered aid to pro-Communist Laotians.	
	Prince Sihanouk, discussing the Laotian crisis with Ambassador Trimble, said he feels that it may be too late to arrive at a solution through an international conference. Sihanouk said the only alternative to an early settlement would be a division of the country. He deplores this prospect, fearing division would lead to a Communist state on Cambodia's northern border.	25X1
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		Minister	Fears	Change	in	NATO
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(Pursuant to his complaint that Bonn is not being treated as a full and equal member of NATO, Strauss cited a "US refusal" of his offer to provide an Honest John missile unit as part of a West German contribution to the proposed mobile NATO fire brigade. He also cited a "rejection" of Bonn's offer to pay for two Polaris submarines as part of a NATO nuclear force even though the United States had been prepared to offer two each to France and Italy. Strauss remarked that although all NATO members continually call for strengthening NATO, "these platitudes do not commit the person who makes them to action." Strauss has been critical of the inaction on Bonn's long-standing request that the provisions in the 1954 Brussels treaty which restrict the size of German destroyers to 3,000 tons be lifted to enable construction of heavier ships capable of firing intermediate-range missiles. Pending authorization of larger ships, Bonn will construct no more than four of the twelve originally planned.)

Strauss has repeatedly insisted that West German armed forces should possess weapons comparable to those of the USSR. He has warned that atomic weapons cannot be withdrawn from the NATO shield forces without undermining the NATO deterrent. On 2 March the Defense Ministry press chief issued a public statement strongly rejecting the concept that "brushfire" wars should be waged only with conventional weapons in order to avoid a widening of such wars into a nuclear conflict. Last November a German Foreign Ministry official stated that any plan that might deprive NATO forces of tactical atomic weapons would be an open invitation to the Communists to overrun Europe.


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Growing Danger of Afghan-Pakistani Border Clashes

Since 1947, when Pakistan received its independence, Afghanistan has demanded that the Pushtoon tribes living on the Pakistani side of the border be given the right of self-determination. The Pakistani Government, however, has rejected these demands as interference in its internal affairs, and the resultant Pushtoonistan dispute has been the chief cause of the bad relations that exist between the two countries.

Both Kabul and Rawalpindi are trying to improve their positions in anticipation of the increased friction that usually accompanies the seasonal tribal migrations. The Afghans feel compelled to recoup some of the prestige they lost last September when their tribal irregulars were driven back from Pakistani tribal territory. They probably feel that their position in the Pushtoonistan dispute has been further weakened as a result of the recent improvement in Pakistan's relations with the USSR and consider it all the more necessary to make a show of strength and determination. Kabul apparently calculates that it can encourage tribal unrest across the border and prepare for possible Pakistani retaliation by building up its regular and irregular forces along the border. Pakistani leaders have threatened that if they are forced to take major countermeasures, they may send regular forces into Afghan territory.

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The Afghans, who have long objected to American military assistance to Pakistan, have complained bitterly about Pakistan's recent use of US-supplied aircraft. Legally, Pakistan is entitled to use such weapons to maintain internal security. Radio Kabul attacks the United States as giving "hollow assurances that arms aid which was being given to Pakistan would not be used against anybody else except against the enemies of America in case of a world war. . . . The US rulers are also responsible for the annihilation of Pushtoonistan and martyrdom of the Pushtoons."

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